

Operation Thunderstorm in South Africa

by Billy van der Merve¹

Inkathagate is haunting the media like a ghost, and not only in South Africa. On its face, this is a matter of the South African government's financing of the *Inkatha Freedom Party* of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. It is a known fact that *Inkatha* is a puppet organization manipulated by the South African apartheid regime. Proofs of the covert cooperation between *Inkatha* and Pretoria's intelligence services and security forces have been published by *Top Secret*.² But the extent of *Inkathagate* that has been publicly confessed to - after long hesitation - has revealed only the tip of a massive iceberg: attempts to retain "white power" in the Cape region through a reformed and not openly proclaimed form of apartheid.

The following facts that have come to light are no longer denied by the apartheid regime:

1) In 1990 alone, Buthelezi's party received 250,000 Rands from a secret fund of de Klerk's government.

2) Since 1986, more than 1.5 million Rands were channeled into *Inkatha*'s so-called labor organization, the *United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)*. Furthermore, the founding of *UWUSA* in 1986 was a "police project" aimed at counteracting the growing influence of the South African labor-union association *COSATU*. In accordance with this aim, *UWUSA* members primarily acted as militant strike-breakers and armed agents provocateurs against strike actions organized by *COSATU*. In the ensuing clashes, it was generally *COSATU* members who ended up among the dead and wounded.

This funding was organized by influential members of de Klerk's Cabinet, in particular by Minister for Law and Order Adriaan Vlok and Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha. However, *Top Secret* has received reliable information from South African secret service circles that de Klerk not only was personally informed by his *National Intelligence Service (NIS)* about the financial assistance being received by *Inkatha* but expressly authorized it.

These facts make it clear that *Inkathagate* was not due to mistakes made by individual ministers; rather, it was a project of the government as a whole, aimed at building up *Inkatha*, by all available means, as a strong rival of the *African National Congress (ANC)*.

The flood of *Inkathagate* disclosures has revealed what immense financial reserves the apartheid regime made available for such "dirty tricks". During the past four years, the South African government's fund for financing this kind of covert operation amounted to the amazing sum of 1.5 billion Rands. For 1991, Pretoria's strategists have 380 million Rands available for this purpose. This fund, distributed among various ministries and governmental as well as semi-governmental institutions, was established in 1978 as part of an action to support "services of a covert nature" on behalf of the "national interest".³

Regular readers of *Top Secret* will remember that in 1989, during the election campaign that preceded Namibia's independence, the Editor-in-Chief of the magazine, Michael Opperskalski, and his British colleague Nick Wright succeeded in working together for almost two weeks, in disguise, with Nico Basson, who was at that time the Chief of Propaganda of the South African military secret service, *DMI*, in Namibia.⁴ During this period they learned in detail about the "dirty tricks" which Pretoria was using in its attempts to prevent SWAPO from winning the election, as it was generally expected to do. The facts that *Top Secret* was the first to publish have now been confirmed by Nico Basson himself.⁵

Experiences in Namibia

The South African government strategy which was given the code name *Operation Agree* was essentially based on two elements: the creation of one or more alternatives to SWAPO, and a massive campaign of election fraud and intimidation. (It was assumed that Sam Nujoma's liberation movement would win the election, but the government's aim was to keep his majority under the two-thirds that was necessary for drawing up the Constitution and for making later constitutional amendments.)

Before and during the election, the South African regime financed at least seven anti-SWAPO parties through secret channels, in the amount of at least 35 million U.S. dollars. Most of this money was collected by the strongest of these parties, the *Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)*. The rest went to: the *SWAPO Democrats*, the *Patriotic Unity Movement (PUM)*, the *National Patriotic Front of Namibia (NPF)*, the *Workers' Revolutionary Party*, the *United Democratic Front of Namibia*, the *Parents' Committee*, and the *Political Consultative Committee (PCC)*. Money from the South African secret service fund also was received by the most important opposition newspaper in Namibia, the *Times of Namibia*, which is linked with the *DTA*.

In their propaganda, the authors of this covert strategy who were in Nico Basson's circle concentrated on organizing a national and international campaign accusing

1 Billy van der Merve is the pseudonym of a high-ranking officer in the South African intelligence community, with whom *Top Secret* communicates regularly. The information passed on by Mr. van der Merve has been carefully edited by *Top Secret*'s Editor Michael Opperskalski for journalistic and security reasons

2 cf. the detailed account in *Top Secret*, Autumn 1990, p. 28 ff. and other journals

3 cf. "die tageszeitung" (Berlin), 24 July 1991

4 cf. the detailed account in *Top Secret*, Namibia Special, October 1989

5 cf. *Independent*, 11 June 1991; *SouthScan*, 7 June 1991 and 14 July 1991, etc.

SWAPO of torturing its own members who were in exile. The sponsor of this campaign was the so-called *Parents' Committee*. Michael Opperskalski and Nick Wright were eyewitnesses as Nico Basson - officially Director of the South African *DMI* firm *African Communication Project* and employed by the *DTA* for press and propaganda work - guided this campaign from Room 111 of the building which at that time was the headquarters of the *DTA*.

Election fraud and intimidation were everyday occurrences in Namibia, even as newspapers throughout the

Nonetheless, Pretoria was able to achieve one success: it managed to push SWAPO's electoral victory under the decisive two-thirds majority. This has forced SWAPO, the ruling party in Namibia as a result of that election, to make drastic constitutional and political compromises with the opposition, and thus with South Africa. At the same time, it has laid the groundwork for the manipulation that can be expected during the regional and local elections at the end of this year and the next national election in 1994.

Operation Agree II

We can expect to see a scenario similar to the one that was staged during the first national election in 1989 - but this time without the presence of international observers, which was a critical obstacle for Pretoria in 1989. As part of the South African government's pre-election preparations, even before the revelations of *Inkathagate*, ca. 80 million Rands were transferred from secret funds to various secret accounts in Namibia and South Africa, stashed away to be used later for precisely targeted intervention in the Namibian elections. Most of these funds will once again be spent on the opposition party *DTA* and specifically targeted media operations against SWAPO.

The South African media strategists intend to exploit the economic and political problems that have resulted from Namibia's still-new independence, which have in part been engineered by Pretoria's strategists. In Nico Basson's words, South Africa intends to "let SWAPO make every possible mistake".²

And such "mistakes", especially economic ones, are being "organized" so that SWAPO can then be accused of corruption and mismanagement. However, the fact is that South Africa is pumping money out of Namibia on a massive scale - legally, semi-legally, and illegally. This is being organized by persons who hold various positions within the Namibian government and operate as agents of Pretoria's influence. Many of them have close connections to the South African secret-service community.

We can provide several examples here. The *Tender Board* is in charge of granting publicly advertised government contracts in Namibia. This board has been, and continues to be, indirectly influenced by South Africa, which has resulted in the granting of numerous contracts to South African firms, firms partially owned by South Africans, and "Namibian" firms which are fronts for South African ones. In this way, money is filtered out of the country legally, and at the same time contracts of the Namibian government are influenced by South Africa. These operations are made easier by the fact that the Rand is the official currency of both Namibia and South Africa, and that the Namibian banking system is controlled by its "big neighbor".

In this connection, South African secret-service circles leaked to us the information that a certain Mr. W.N. Greef plays a key role in these operations on the Namibian *Tender Board*. According to our informants, Greef has excellent contacts with the South African secret services and coordinates his activities with them. He has contacts to the *DMI* agent John Engels, who has "built up" South African front firms in Namibia, e.g. a small chemical firm which was until recently active in the logistical support of the UNITA contras. Another person of this type is a certain Cohen van Zyl, whose contacts in-

Top Secret

International edition of *Geheim*
Namibia Election Special

Reinforcing
the
Washington
Pretoria Axis

Terrorising
public opinion
in Namibia

Dirty election
tricks

Fixing the
vote for
apartheid

UNITA still
active in
Namibia



Top Secret's Namibia Special (October '89)

world were spinning tales about "free and fair" elections. Not only did South African citizens and members of the Angolan contra army UNITA register to vote; not only did election booths never arrive at some villages in northern Namibia which were SWAPO strongholds; members of the *DMI* and the *CCB* were also responsible for numerous acts of violence during the elections, including the creation of an armed gang of dissidents commanded by the Vice President of the *DTA*, Mishake Muyango.¹ The fact that the violence in Namibia did not eventually reach South African proportions is due less to the good will of those responsible for this campaign than to the large numbers of international observers who were present.

1 cf. the detailed account in *Top Secret, Namibia Special*, October 1989
 2 quoted from SouthScan, 14 June 1991

clude people at the highest levels of the South African government.

Once the Namibian election campaign has reached its "hot phase", all needed will stand ready to organize intimidation campaigns at the command of South African strategists, as they did in 1989. The network of the *CCB* and the *DMI* has not been completely destroyed, nor have the members of the special units *Kovoet*, *Battalion 101*, and *Battalion 102* totally disappeared from the scene. And *Mishake Muyango's* armed (*DTA*) dissidents - who are in many cases identical with the special units created by South Africa during the colonial period to combat *SWAPO* - can be reactivated. Some of these personnel are still in Namibia, others are among the *UNITA* ranks, still others are in the Namibian harbor *Walfish Bay*, which is still occupied by South Africa, or concentrated in the South African military base at *Upington*, not far from the Namibian border. In the words of a source already known to us, Nico Basson: "Intimidation is the only thing that works in Africa."¹ Furthermore, South Africa has placed *important influence agents in the Namibian security apparatus, who are in a position to carry out destabilization activities: Henk Reeder, currently head of the Namibian Defence Force, and Derek Brune, now head of security in Namibian President Sam Nujoma's office.*² Both are *DMI* agents.

Intervention in Angola Too

Suddenly, almost unnoticed by international public opinion, peace reigns in Angola. After 16 years of war, the ruling MPLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA agreed in early summer of this year on a truce, free elections, a multi-party system etc. The war has devastated this potentially rich country. Those responsible for this are primarily the South African apartheid regime and the U.S. administration, which provided massive military and material aid to Savimbi's contras - aid that included regular military invasions directed by Pretoria - in an effort to bomb the MPLA out of power.

But although the truce has - for the moment - ended the war, it has not ended the massive intervention of South Africa and North America in this country. In the last issue of *Top Secret*,³ we documented, in great detail, how Washington and Pretoria armed UNITA in 1990. This military aid was continued literally until the final minutes of the negotiations that ended the war. Thus for example, *Hercules 130* and *Dakota* planes of the *South African Air Force* were flying arms shipments to Savimbi's forces as far as Jamba at least until the end of May 1991 (!). These planes started from two bases: *Upington*, north of Cape Town, and *Wonderboom* near Pretoria. The CIA too, supported by Israel, continued its shipments of military aid until recently. Angola's neighbor Zaire was used as a base for reserve forces and supplies.

Ship deliveries of U.S. and Israeli weapons were observed in the harbor of *Matadi*, Zaire, and CIA transport planes were observed flying arms from *Kamina Air Base* in southern Zaire to *Jamba*. The aim of these intensified arms deliveries to UNITA was to arm Savimbi's troops optimally before the truce was declared, thus preparing them for all eventualities.

Now that the truce has been declared, Washington's and Pretoria's secret service operations have shifted more to the political level, but their goal remains the same: a change in the power structure in Luanda in favor of Jonas Savimbi. These activities are being closely coordinated. According to sources in the South African secret service, since the beginning of this year there have been several high-level meetings for this purpose between the CIA and the South African secret services *NIS* and *DMI*. (*Top Secret* knows exact details concerning some of these meetings, including the names of the participants; however, we cannot publish any of these details yet, for fear of directly or indirectly revealing the identity of our sources.) The Pretoria/Washington axis against the MPLA is in place!

The political operations in Angola will develop according to the pattern set by the actions in Namibia.

First, an apparatus is being built up in order to develop effective propaganda activities on behalf of UNITA. The CIA and the South African secret services are currently providing UNITA with material support of its construction of a UNITA television broadcasting station whose range will cover the whole country. The Contras already have a radio station that can broadcast to the whole country. Furthermore, the publication of a newspaper is being planned. The purpose of these activities is to build up a media empire in Angola that is controlled by Savimbi.

Official U.S. aid provided to UNITA in this year alone amounted to 20 million dollars.⁴ This is being supplemented with funding channeled to UNITA via CIA-front firms and right-wing "pressure groups" (e.g. *Freedom Inc.*, the *World Anti-Communist League*, the *International Freedom Foundation* etc.). Further sources of funding are donations from Pretoria and profits from the diamond and ivory smuggling that is organized by UNITA.

The South African secret services *NIS* and *DMI* are securing their continued influence over UNITA's propaganda activities via structures they are building up in France. Nico Basson refers to this operation as the "French Connection".⁵ One of these structures is the firm *Interaction International*, which was founded by Mike Wells, a *NIS* officer and long-time employee of the South African Foreign Ministry, and *DMI* man Philipe Bohn. Their task will be to organize and channel international support for UNITA, working together with other right-wing influence organizations. For example, it was Philipe Bohn who in May 1991 put together a delegation of Members of the European Parliament for a visit to the UNITA headquarters in Jamba.

Wells and Bohn were brought together last year by a certain Sean Cleary, who is employed in Johannesburg as Managing Director of a consulting firm called *Strategic Concepts*. This consulting firm is being used as a screen by none other than the *National Intelligence Service (NIS)* of South Africa. Cleary already has the appropriate experience: from 1985 on, before Namibia became independent, he worked as a "consultant" for the South-Africa-controlled colonial administrative structure (called the *Transitional Government of National Unity*). His clients included *SWAPO* opponents who headed the so-called *SWAPO-D* (*Anderas Shipanga*) and *SWANU* (*Moses Katjiuongua*). Cleary has excellent personal contacts with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and his firm has equally good contacts with *Black*, *Manafort*, *Stone* and

1 quoted from *The Independent*, 11 June 1991

2 cf. also: *SouthScan*, 14 June 1991

3 cf. the detailed account in *Top Secret*, Autumn 1990, p. 19 ff.

4 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 June 1991

5 cf. *SouthScan*, 14 June 1991, 12 July 1991

A message to all who work with the secret services and security organizations of South Africa:

Help us to build up a more just South Africa. Apartheid is dying. Help to make the transition to a new, more just society as painless as possible. Do what your colleagues are doing.

Secure your future and that of your families! Contact us! Inform us about the dirty tricks of those who would like to reverse the wheel of history! Send us, anonymously if you choose, information, names, and background information about secret-service operations!

Contact address:
Postfach (P.O. Box) 270324
5000 Köln (Cologne)
GERMANY
Tel.: 49-221-51 37 51;
Fax: 49-221-52 95 52

Kelly, who organize UNITA propaganda in the USA. It should also be mentioned in this connection that Cleary has been made a member of the *South African Forum of Reconciliation*, in which South African businessmen and representatives of South African churches work together to develop "possible solutions to the current violence in South Africa". In short, Cleary is a strategist for the NIS.

Another element of the so-called "French Connection" is a certain Alain Guenon, who officially has consulting contracts with the oil company *Elf* and the construction firm *Batignolles*, and also represents the *Sagem* firm, which is part of the French military-industrial complex. All of these firms are economically active in Angola. Thus Guenon has the task of effectively exerting influence on the Angolan government.

But the CIA and its South African partners are still counting primarily on the elements of military pressure, terrorism, and organized intimidation to influence the Angolan elections for their own benefit. To be sure, the peace treaty signed by the MPLA and UNITA calls for the dissolution of both sides' military formations and the creation of a national army, but elite units of UNITA are being specifically exempted from this process. They are being withdrawn to neighboring Zaire and are stationed there, heavily armed, in and around *Kamina Air Base*, together with their CIA leaders. In addition, during the past few weeks about 300 ex-members of the notorious Namibian/South African unit *Koevoet* were put in readiness for this purpose. A further factor is the notorious South African army unit *Battalion 32*, which was built up by Pretoria in the 'Seventies using soldiers from the Contra group *FNLA*. Members of this unit are currently being prepared at their base near *Pomfret*, South Africa, for possible action in Angola. In order to ensure the fastest possible transport of this unit, a small airport has been built during the past weeks; it is part of this military

base and provides enough landing space for C-130 transport planes to take off and land. All of these preparations are for the purpose of holding open a military option for UNITA and the South African government.

There is also the element of possible specifically targeted terrorist activities in case the elections do not transpire according to the wishes of the strategists in Washington and Pretoria. As early as last year, a terrorist organization was created which officially operates independently of UNITA; its name is *Catana Ardente (Burning Sword)*. For this purpose members of the South African special unit *Bat 21*, among others, were smuggled into Angola, disguised as returnees.¹

These destabilization activities in Namibia and Angola and the continuing support of the Mozambique contras of the MNR by South African secret-service circles prove that Pretoria has not given up its neo-colonial plans to maintain hegemony in the entire region of southern Africa.

Operation Thunderstorm in South Africa

The activities of the apartheid regime's secret services against the ANC in South Africa have the same characteristics as the operations in Namibia and Angola that we have already described. These activities go under the code name *Operation Thunderstorm*.²

One element of this operation is that of organized violence. For years, the *CCB* and special police units have been preparing *Inkatha* units for military and terrorist actions against the ANC. The necessary weapons are provided by the South African military secret service from stocks which it has bought from Israel and Mozambique.³ But not only *Inkatha* units have been armed and trained; gangs of criminals have also received weapons and training.⁴ In the past few months, such training programs have been intensified, notwithstanding repeated denials by the apartheid regime and President de Klerk. One of the bases used for this training program, *Vlakplaas*, has even had its capacity expanded.⁵ And the climate of violence is having an effect. Nico Basson says, "The message has reached Soweto: if you're for the ANC, you're risking your life (...) Six months ago you could see people everywhere wearing ANC T-shirts, in front of some of the houses there were even ANC flags waving. All that has disappeared. A result of the intimidation campaign (...)."⁶

In charge of propaganda activities are strategists from the *South African Army Troops Information Unit (SATI)*, which stands under the direct control of the *DMI*. Its activities are coordinated by very high-ranking officials with those of the *NIS*. One of the officers in charge is a certain Colonel Tony Vermaak. The media campaigns organized by these forces have included, e.g. the exploitation of Winnie Mandela's trial with the goal of discrediting her husband, Nelson Mandela; repeated "disclosures" to the effect that the ANC is controlled by the *Communist Party (SACP)*; and the deliberate channeling of so-called "hot items" to the South African press that are meant to "burn" leading figures of the ANC. An example from the latter category is the "disclosures" concerning alleged spy services performed by the General Secretary of the ANC

1 cf. in detail on *Catana Ardente*: *Top Secret*, Autumn 1990

2 cf. also: *Top Secret*, Autumn 1990

3 cf. *ibid.*

4 *Top Secret* has detailed information, e.g. concerning Inkatha's armed bases in some townships, and the names of criminal gangs that are armed and controlled by South African security forces.

5 cf. also: *Top Secret*, Autumn 1990

6 quoted from: *die tageszeitung*, 18 June 1991

Youth League for the security police. These "disclosures" were then cleverly blamed on officials of the ANC security service. (Especially with regard to these "disclosures" the CIA plays an important supportive role. By way of proof, we offer the example of the CIA-front organization *International Freedom Foundation (IFF)*, which has an office in Johannesburg. Recently the *IFF* has mounted a veritable media campaign against the *SACP*.) The goals of all of these operations are to divide the liberation movement ANC, to discredit its leading figures, and to dissolve or compromise the strategic alliance between the ANC, the *SACP*, and the labor unions (*COSATU*). Simultaneously, alternatives to the ANC are being built up, as *Inkathagate* has proved. All of this is taking place while the international sanctions against the apartheid regime are crumbling and South Africa's international isolation is being gradually broken through (including the fact that even former friends of the ANC, such as the USSR, are entering into close relationships with Pretoria). In an internal *NIS* strategy paper whose existence is known to *Top Secret*, the assumption is made that *Operation Thunderstorm* will maneuver the ANC, step by step, into a position of weakness, both at the national and the international levels, which will worsen the country's climate of terrorism and tension, intensify the internal conflicts and contradictions within the liberation movement, and thus lead to a situation in which the ANC's leadership will be ready to make compromises regarding their basic principles (with the attendant dangers of splits, confrontations and a decrease in the ANC's pres-

tige among the African majority of the country.) The *NIS* strategy paper also assumes that the climate of terrorism and intimidation that has been created by the South African security forces will severely weaken the readiness of the majority of the South African people to actively support the ANC and participate in its public activities. In the view of the *NIS* strategists, important members of the ANC leadership are now no longer personally inclined to throw their weight behind a "course of radical opposition" (breaking off the negotiations, possibly risking the organization's being again declared illegal, renewed exile, armed struggle). "They have grown accustomed to the advantages of legality", according to the *NIS* strategy paper. The strategists continue, after they have played out several possible political scenarios for the near future: "(...) they will return to the negotiating table in any case, but we will be the ones who lay down the conditions (...)."

The aim of all these considerations and strategies is obvious: apartheid without visible apartheid, the retention of white power at the southern tip of Africa. But secret services and their strategists have often made mistakes in the past. Their weak point is their strategic amalgamation with the ruling elites of their respective countries, whose executive agents they are. This amalgamation causes them to underestimate the dynamic force of mass movements and overvalue the role of individual persons. And the South African masses have had enough of apartheid - in any form!

Who is Who in South Africa's Security System

Acheson, Donald

Temporarily detained regarding the Lubowski killing. Allegedly connected to the *CCB*.

Badenhorst, Witkop

General, Chief of Staff of *Military Intelligence*. Denied knowledge of the *CCB* until November 1989

Barnard, Ferdinand

CCB member. Temporarily detained regarding the Webster killing

Barnard, Frik

Major, *Military Intelligence*, Head of *Johannesburg Security Department*

Beetge, Johan

Johannesburg Security Department member

Bohn, Philipe

DMI; Economic cover: co-founder of the company *Interaction International*, Paris

Bosch, Steve Stg.

Officer at *Vlakplaas*

Botha, Calla

CCB member. Temporarily detained regarding the Webster killing

Brits, Christo

Alias for *CCB Region 6* (i.e. internal South African operations) Coordinator

Brits, 'Duiwel'

Officer at *Vlakplaas*

Buchner, Jack

Military Intelligence (DMI) officer; at present Chef of the Kwa Zulu "Homeland" police. One of the responsible figures for coordinating the regimes "dirty tricks" against the ANC with the *Inkatha Freedom Party*

Top Secret/Summer 1991

Burger, "Staal"

Regional Manager of the *CCB*. Implicated in the Lubowski killing

Cilliers, Braam

Officer in charge of files at *South African Defence Force Special Services* offices.

Cleary, Sean

NIS; Economic cover: Managing Director of the consulting firm *Strategic Concepts*; member of the *SA Forum of Reconciliation*

Coetzee, Jan

Lieutenant-Colonel. Former head of operations including *Unit C1*.

Coetzee, Johannes Dirk

Former Captain. Former head of *Unit C1*.

De Swardt, Paul

Military Intelligence officer and *Johannesburg Security Department* member. Implicated in the Webster killing.

Du Preetz

Brigadier. Security branch officer in Pretoria; implicated in the *Unit C1*

Egan, John

Johannesburg Security Department member

Geldenhuys, Jannie

General. Until recently chief of the *South African Defence Force*; confirmed the order creating the *CCB*

Gordon, Edward "Peaches"

CCB member

Gouws, Hannes

Former *Johannesburg Security Department* member

Heerden, Capt. Brood van

Officer at *Vlakplaas*

Henning, Martin

Johannesburg Security Department member

~~Report, A.J.M. JOUBERT~~

Major-General. Former Commanding Officer of Special Forces including the CCB

Kane-Bergmann, John

NIS; Director of the Institute of Race Relations (NIS front organization)

Klopper, Chappie Lt
Officer at Vlakplaas

Kok, Eugene de
Officer at Vlakplaas

Liebemberg, A.J.

General. Newly appointed chief of the South African Defence Force. Organised predecessor units to CCB

Mamasela, Joe

Security policeman. Implicated in Unit C1 and a raid into Botswana

Maree, Chappie

CCB member. Implicated in the Lubowski killing

Naude, Tony

Johannesburg Security Department member

Ngqulunga, Brian

Former security policeman. Implicated in Unit C1. Confessed involvement in the Mxenge killing

Pearce, John

Johannesburg Security Department security chief

Pfeil, Hein

South African Defence Force and CCB bookkeeper

Schoon, Willem

Retired Brigadier. Former head of operations including Unit C1

Stoffberg, Dirk

Officer of Military Intelligence (DMI). Responsible for Z-Squads in Europe; involved into the assassination of ANC-Chief Representative to France, Dulcie September

Tshikalange, David

Unit C1 member

Van der Hoven

Former Port Natal security branch commander. Implicated in Unit C1

Van Deventer, Willie

CCB member

Van Zyl, Abraham "Slang"

CCB member

VLAKPLAAS

BOSCH, STEVE STG
BRITS, 'DUWEL'
HEERDEN, CAPT BLOD VAN
KLOPPER, CHAPPIE, LT.
KOK, EUGENE DE

Vermaak, Tony Colonel

DMI; Propaganda and disinformation specialist

Verster, Joe

Colonel. Current chief of the CCB

Viljoen, Constand

General. Former chief of the South African Defence Force; reportedly gave order to create the CCB

Webb, Eddie

Major-General. Commanding Office of Special Forces including the CCB

Wells, Mike

NIS; Economic cover: co-founder of the company *Interaction International*, Paris

South Africa's Security Personnel in Namibia

1) National Intelligence Service (NIS)

De Lange, Riaan

Official status: Assistant Representative at the *Office of South African Representative* (diplomatic mission), Windhoek

Vorster, Anna F.

Official status: Assistant Representative at the *Office of the South African Representative* (diplomatic mission)

2) Military Intelligence (DMI), CCB and others

Brune, Derek

DMI; head of security in Namibian President's office

Engels, John

DMI; economic cover

Reeder, Henk

DMI; currently head of the *Namibian Defence Force*

Van Niekerk, Louis

(CCB) Involved into special operations in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Malawi. Cover in Namibia: *Namibia Sports Promotion* company

Van Zyl, Cohen

Economic cover; DMI or CCB (?)

Vandenberg, Louis

Former SWADF-commander, DMI. Cover: *Namibia Sports Promotion* company

Naming Names

by Enrique Bermudez

U.S. foreign policy, both overt and covert, is administered through what is known as the country team concept. This country team, nominally headed by the Ambassador, is composed of the highest-ranking Foreign Service Officer within a given country, including the CIA's *Chief of Station (COS)*. His job is to concretize the often vague platitudes issued by Washington. The CIA's role in all this, of course, is the implementation of clandestine aspects of foreign policy, a role that has been unquestioned until today.

Bureaucratically speaking, the Agency's clandestine network at the covert operations it sprawns operate under the *Directorate of Operations* - better known as *Clandestine Services* - section of the *Central Intelligence Agency*. Two of the Agency's other three *Directorates*, *Management and Services*, and *Science and Technology*, are largely used by *Clandestine Services*. The key figures, at least in

an operational sense, within the CIA infrastructure are known as *Chief of Stations (COS)*. Usually located within the U.S. embassy compound, *Chiefs of Station* are charged with maintaining, creating, and exploring the infrastructure within a given country. CIA intelligence within political parties, civic associations, student groups, labor unions, media, the military, and other government agen-